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ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE, VOTING, AND POLITICAL 
SUPPORT: A UNIFIED APPROACH 
Henry W. Chappell, Jr.* 
Abstract-A presidential vote function and a presidential 
approval ratings function are jointly estimated for U.S. post- 
war observations. The estimation technique treats the two 
equations as seemingly unrelated regressions with unequal 
numbers of observations. Cross-equation restrictions implying 
that voters and poll respondents use identical standards in 
judging the economic performance of incumbents are imposed 
and tested. Estimates show that both votes and approval 
ratings are influenced by GNP growth and inflation. The 
results suggest that poll respondents are more inflation averse 
than voters; however, tests of this hypothesis are not conclu- 
sive. 
THERE is agreement that macroeconomic is- 
1 sues "matter" for political evaluations, but 
how they matter is not fully understood. Differing 
theoretical perspectives underlie some disagree- 
ments, and inherent data limitations have pro- 
vided further obstacles to consensus. This paper 
focuses on issues related to data limitations and 
adopts a method for efficiently using data which 
are available. 
By empirically linking the time series for an 
incumbent party's vote share to key economic 
indicators, one can gain information about how 
voters evaluate economic performance. In well- 
known studies, Kramer (1971) and Fair (1978, 
1982, 1988) have analyzed congressional and pres- 
idential elections in this manner. Other studies of 
U.S. voting outcomes have also followed this gen- 
eral research strategy.' 
Despite the appeal of this method, one limita- 
tion is notable. If one restricts attention to the 
post-war period for the United States, there are 
only 11 observations for presidential election out- 
comes, and only 22 observations for congressional 
elections. It is difficult to draw clear inferences 
about the influence of economic events on elec- 
tions given this paucity of data. Fair and Kramer 
tackled this problem by expanding their sample 
periods backward in time. For example, Fair 
(1988) makes use of 18 presidential election ob- 
servations beginning with the 1916 election. This 
modestly expands the sample but it also intro- 
duces additional perils. Economic data are less 
reliable for the pre-war period, and voter atti- 
tudes about government responsibility for eco- 
nomic conditions are likely to have changed over 
the course of the century. The idiosyncrasies of 
two world wars and an unparalleled depression 
also lead one to question the appropriateness of 
including earlier observations. 
Other researchers have avoided the observa- 
tion shortage problem by investigating an alterna- 
tive time series: poll evaluations of presidential 
performance. For about 40 years, the Gallup Poll 
has periodically asked respondents whether they 
approve or disapprove of the incumbent presi- 
dent's handling of his job. Survey results are 
available for quarterly (or even more frequent) 
periods, and provide a reasonably long time se- 
ries which can be linked to economic perfor- 
mance indicators. Many studies have done so; 
Hibbs (1982a, 1982b, 1987) provides notable re- 
cent examples.2 
Unfortunately, poll data also have limitations. 
Respondents may have little incentive to respond 
accurately to survey questions.3 Even if respon- 
dents are truthful, the question posed by the 
survey is not identical to that of vote choice. The 
poll question focuses attention on current and 
past incumbent performance, while voting pre- 
sumably involves some comparison of alternative 
future prospects. Moreover, respondent interpre- 
tations of poll questions apparently vary over the 
Received for publication January 23, 1989. Revision ac- 
cepted for publication November 22, 1989. 
*University of South Carolina. I acknowledge the helpful 
comments of McKinley Blackburn, John Chilton, William 
Keech, Pedro Portugal, Paul Rothstein and two anonymous 
referees. 
ISee Paldam (1981) for a review of the literature on voting 
functions. 
2 Paldam's (1981) review and the recent paper of Dua and 
Smyth (1989) together provide a comprehensive listing of such 
studies. 
3Chilton (1989) shows that poll respondents may have in- 
centives to misrepresent their true preferences. 
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electoral cycle, requiring additional care in the 
specification of an empirical model. 
One striking feature of the literature on vote 
functions and political support functions (i.e., ap- 
proval ratings functions) is that almost all studies 
are restricted to the analysis of either voting or 
poll responses.4 This is so even though many 
researchers apparently view the two data sources 
as good substitutes for one another, and implic- 
itly accept the premise that vote functions and 
political support functions are manifestations of 
the same underlying behavior. If this premise is 
correct, it is sensible to use both data sources 
rather than to discard one or the other. 
In this paper, I jointly estimate vote and politi- 
cal support functions for U.S. presidents. Assum- 
ing that voters and survey respondents evaluate 
economic conditions according to the same stan- 
dards, cross-equation restrictions are implied for 
parameters of the two equations. I impose and 
test these parameter restrictions, in effect testing 
the hypothesis of "behavioral consistency" for 
voters and survey respondents. If the hypothesis 
is rejected, the validity of testing propositions 
about voting behavior with approval ratings data 
would be seriously questioned. If it is not re- 
jected, we could be more confident of inferences 
about voting behavior which are based on ap- 
proval ratings data. 
An econometric model suitable for jointly ana- 
lyzing vote and approval ratings equations is de- 
scribed in section I below. This is essentially a 
seemingly unrelated regressions (SUR) model in 
which there are unequal numbers of observations 
for the two equations.5 Section II describes the 
specifications of equations to explain approval 
ratings and votes and section III provides empiri- 
cal results. Conclusions are discussed in sec- 
tion IV. 
I. An Econometric Model for Voting and 
Political Support 
I specify a two equation model with one equa- 
tion determining presidential approval ratings and 
the other presidential voting: 
At =a + bSt + cXt + et (la) 
Vt = + St + yZt + ut, (lb) 
where 
At= the percentage answering "approve" in 
response to the survey question: "Do you 
approve or disapprove of the way that 
is handling his job as president?," 
Vt= the percentage of the two-party vote fa- 
voring the party of the incumbent presi- 
dent in the presidential election taking 
place in quarter t (Vt is observed only in 
quarters when there is a presidential 
election), 
St= a measure of economic performance for 
quarter t (described in more detail be- 
low), 
Xt= a vector of other exogenous variables af- 
fecting approval ratings, 
Zt= a vector of other exogenous variables af- 
fecting presidential votes, 
a, b, a, and ,3 are scalar parameters, 
c and y are vectors of parameters. 
The error terms, et and ut, are assumed to 
have a bivariate normal density function fe, l 
(et, ut) such that E(et) = E(ut) = 0, E(et) = 
E(u2) = o-u2, and E(etut) = oeu for all t. All 
cross-time error covariances are initially assumed 
to equal zero: E(etet-i) = E(utut_i) = E(etut-,) 
= E(utet_1) = 0 for all t and for i 0 0. I later 
alter the model to permit serially correlated er- 
rors in the approval ratings equation. 
Economic performance, St, will itself be a 
function of several economic indicators. Previous 
work has suggested that inflation, unemployment, 
and economic growth are of interest to voters, so 
a simple measure of economic performance could 
take the following form: 
St =c115t + &?2Ut + &?w 3Y.t (2) 
4Hibbs (1987) and others have illustrated that approval 
ratings and election outcomes are correlated, but have not 
tested the hypothesis that economic events affect approval 
ratings and votes in a consistent manner. 
5 Schmidt (1977) has described estimation techniques for the 
SUR model when there are unequal numbers of observations. 
Parks (1967) describes methods for handling serially corre- 
lated errors in the SUR context. Also see Anderson (1957) on 
issues related to maximum likelihood estimation methods 
when there are missinig observations. 
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In this equation Pt is the absolute value of a 
moving average of quarterly inflation rates pre- 
vailing under the incumbent president up until 
period t, and UJ and Yt are similar averages of 
unemployment and real GNP growth rates. The 
wois are parameters which indicate the relative 
importance of the various economic performance 
variables. 
Substituting (2) into (la) and (lb) the two 
equations of the model can be rewritten: 
At a + b((0lPt + &j2Ut + &o3Yt) + cXt + et 
(3a) 
Vt a? + I3(wPo?t + 02Ut + ?03t) + yZt + ut? 
(3b) 
Note that the wois appear in both vote and 
approval equations, implying that voters and poll 
respondents use the same standards in evaluating 
economic performance. This restriction can be 
tested empirically. Also note that the scale of the 
linear combination defining St is arbitrary; I will 
normalize by setting b = 1 in equation (3a). The 
likelihood function for the model described above 
is provided in appendix 1. 
Serial correlation of the errors is a potential 
problem for the approval ratings equation, and 
the estimation procedure should account for this 
possibility. Although errors within an administra- 
tion's tenure are probably correlated there is 
little reason to believe that the error for the last 
quarter of an outgoing administration will be 
correlated with the error for the succeeding ad- 
ministration in its first quarter in office. Letting Et 
represent the composite error term for the ap- 
proval ratings equation, I respecify the error pro- 
cess as follows: 
et = PDtEt -I + et, (4) 
where Dt equals one if the administration in 
office at time t was also in office at time t - 1, 
and is otherwise equal to zero, p is the autocorre- 
lation coefficient, and et is an error term with the 
properties attributed to it earlier in equation (la). 
With a data transformation analogous to that 
used in handling standard first order serial corre- 
lation problems, the approval ratings equation 
can be rewritten in a form in which serial correla- 
tion is absent. Consider an equation: 
Yt ==f(X ,0) + Et, 
where Et follows the process described by (4). 
Then the transformed equation: 
yt - pDtyt- 1 = t(Xt, 0) - pDtf (Xt- 1, 0) + et 
(5) 
has a serially uncorrelated error term. Assuming 
that the approval ratings equation (3a) has been 
transformed in this manner (given an estimate of 
p),6 the remaining parameters of equations (3a) 
and (3b) can be estimated by the maximum likeli- 
hood method.7 
II. Specifying Vote and Approval Ratings 
Functions 
In specifying vote and approval ratings equa- 
tions I have adopted a conventional approach to 
measuring economic performance. Following 
Kramer, Fair, and Hibbs I include recent obser- 
vations of unemployment, real GNP growth, and 
the absolute value of inflation as performance 
indicators. I define these variables as 4-quarter 
moving averages (including the current quarter) 
except for early term observations for new admin- 
istrations. If a new administration has been in 
office for less than 4 quarters, only within-term 
observations are used to construct the moving 
averages.' Again following convention, I hypothe- 
size that voters and poll respondents reward 
higher income growth and penalize higher unem- 
ployment and higher inflation. 
The simple retrospective voting behavior repre- 
sented by this specification is compatible with 
voter naivete and myopia as assumed by Nord- 
haus (1975) in his model of the political business 
cycle. Although the assumption of voter naivete 
has been questioned, recent research has shown 
that similar retrospective voting patterns may also 
be compatible with rational voting, particularly 
6Note that the cross-equation error correlation permitted 
by the model is restricted to the contemporaneous correlation 
between et and ut. 
7To obtain an estimate of the autocorrelation coefficient p, 
I first estimated the approval ratings equation by OLS, and 
constructed the OLS residuals e. I then regressed t, on 
D e where Dt is defined as in (4). The coefficient on 
Dtet-, provides an estimate of p. This estimate is used to 
transform the approval ratings equation as described in (5). 
The maximum likelihood routine in TSP was then used to 
estimate the remaining parameters of the model. 
8 In this analysis I consider the Kennedy-Johnson and 
Nixon-Ford years as single administrations. 
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when voters are imperfectly informed.9 Models 
specifying alternative interpretations of voter so- 
phistication have also been proposed in the liter- 
ature,10 but I will not pursue the issues posed by 
those models here. 
Noneconomic variables are also included in 
each equation, following conventional practice. 
My selections of noneconomic variables for the 
approval ratings equation follow the example of 
Chappell and Keech (1985) closely."1 To account 
for an early-term "honeymoon," I include six 
dummy variables (POSTk, k = 1,2, .. ., 6) indi- 
cating each of the first six quarters in office for a 
new administration. The series of dummies per- 
mits a flexible honeymoon effect which can per- 
sist until mid-term elections are imminent. I also 
include several variables to control for potentially 
important political events. Dummies are included 
to capture the effects of two major scandals, the 
Watergate events under Nixon (WATERG) and 
the Iran-Contra events under Reagan (IRAN). 
To control for Vietnam war effects, I include a 
variable indicating the number killed in action 
during the quarter (KILLED). I also allow inter- 
cepts to differ for each president in the sample to 
reflect differences in their personal characteris- 
tics, ideological stances, leadership qualities, likely 
opponents, and other attributes. 
My specification for the voting equation is simi- 
lar to that adopted by Fair. I include a dummy 
variable (DEMO) for the party of the incumbent 
president to detect any persistent bias favoring 
one party over the other. I also include a dummy 
(DPER) to indicate that an incumbent president 
is running for reelection.12 Precise variable defi- 
nitions and data sources are listed in appendix 2. 
III. Empirical Results 
The sample for the approval ratings equation 
begins with the first quarter of 1953 and contin- 
ues to the fourth quarter of 1988, and the sample 
for the voting equation includes presidential elec- 
tions from 1948 to 1988.'3 Table 1 presents three 
sets of estimates for the system. Single equation 
estimates are presented first. The voting equation 
is estimated by OLS, while the approval ratings 
equation is estimated by a two-step procedure to 
correct for serial correlation of the form specified 
in equation (4). I next provide maximum likeli- 
hood estimates of the seemingly unrelated regres- 
sions (SUR) model without imposing cross-equa- 
tion restrictions on the ctis. Finally, I provide 
SUR estimates which impose the restriction of 
equal wis across equations. 
For both voting and approval ratings equations 
single equation estimates are similar to the unre- 
stricted SUR model estimates. In the approval 
ratings equation all coefficient signs follow hy- 
pothesized patterns, and most coefficients differ 
significantly from zero at conventional signifi- 
cance levels. In particular, coefficients for GNP 
growth and inflation are significant at the 0.01 
significance level for two-tailed tests in both sets 
of estimates. The unemployment coefficient is 
appropriately negative and moderately large, but 
is not significantly different from zero. 
In the voting equation, economic variables 
again have expected signs, but none is significant 
in the OLS estimation. In SUR results, coeffi- 
cients on GNP growth and inflation have smal- 
ler estimated standard errors and are now 
significant; the unemployment coefficient is now 
positive but remains insignificant.14 The cross- 
equation error covariance for the SUR model is 
positive and significantly different from zero. This 
suggests that efficiency gains from the SUR esti- 
mation technique are potentially important. 
9 Kramer's original work defended retrospective voting as 
reasonable given the costs of information gathering and pro- 
cessing, and Beck (forthcoming) has extended this argument 
while adopting a principal-agent perspective. Alesina and 
Cukierman (1987), Rogoff and Sibert (1988), and Rogoff (1990) 
propose models in which rational voters can learn about the 
competence or preferences of incumbents by observing past 
and current performance, and Peltzman (1988) observes that 
rational voters should reward past and current income growth 
if the income changes are permanent. 
to Chappell (1983), Chappell and Keech (1985), Minford and 
Peel (1982), Peltzman (1988), Richards (1988), and Richards 
and Garman (1988) have proposed models in which voters are 
assumed to have some understanding of macroeconomic con- 
straints. Alesina and Rosenthal (1989) develop a model in 
which voters are explicitly prospective and are aware of parti- 
san reputations for differing macroeconomic policy rules. 
I A detailed discussion of specification issues related to 
noneconomic variables is provided in that paper. 
12 Fair considers Ford a non-incumbent in constructing this 
variable; however, I have coded Ford as an incumbent. 
13 Some approval ratings were available for the Truman 
years; however, polls were not reported with regularity until 
the Eisenhower presidency. 
14 The standard errors reported here are estimated by the 
method proposed by White (1982). Inferences are robust to 
some specification errors when this method is employed. 
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TABLE 1.-ESTIMATED VOTING AND APPROVAL RATINGS EQUATIONS 
(ASYMPTOTIC t-STATISTICS IN PARENTHESES) 
Single Equation Unrestricted SUR Restricted SUR 
Estimates Estimates Estimates 
Parameter Estimate t-statistic Estimate t-statistic Estimate t-statistic 
Ueu 15.612 (2.190)a 11.701 (1.430) 
Approval Equation 
Parameters 
2 24.098 21.303 (7.124)a 21.265 (6.762)a 
p 0.535 0.535 0.535 
EISEN 69.094 (I6.296)a 69.176 (11.141)a 66.785 (10.908)a 
KENNEDY 66.714 (11.840)a 66.825 (10.070)a 63.340 (9.552)a 
JOHNSON 61.487 (12.061)a 61.119 (10.063)a 57.864 (9.193)a 
NIXON 62.890 ( 1.464)a 62.504 (10.441)a 59.233 (7.755)a 
FORD 64.447 (8.585)a 67.564 (6.672)a 61.772 (7.073)a 
CARTER 60.580 (8.597)a 61.125 (7.548)a 56.461 (5.797)a 
REAGAN 63.582 (9.411)a 64.112 (7.605)a 59.192 (6.829)a 
POST, 12.788 (5.855)a 12.785 (4.060)a 12.911 (4.191)a 
POST2 13.699 (5.844)a 13.631 (5.081)a 13.883 (5.331)a 
POST3 9.556 (3.985)a 9.575 (4.710)a 9.793 (4.924)a 
POST4 - 8.888 (3.747)a 8.138 (4.722)a 8.516 (5.255)a 
POST5 8.760 (3.837)a 8.392 (4.219)a 8.635 (4.457)a 
POST6 2.404 (1.241) 2.244 (1.452) 2.319 (1.512) 
KILLED - 1.872 (-1.805)a - 1.573 (-1.899)a - 1.481 (-1.613)a 
WATERG - 16.433 (-3.788)a -14.790 (-3.259)a - 15.725 (3.399)a 
IRAN - 5.624 (-1.430) - 5.690 (-1.684)a - 5.162 (-1.699)a 
P - 1.591 (3.379)a - 1.726 (-3.308)a - 1.551 (-2.766)a 
Y 0.901 (3.496)a 0.886 (3.840)a 0.940 (4.389)a 
U - 1.003 (- 1.299) - 0.981 (-0.989) - 0.507 (-0.509) 
Voting Equation 
Parameters 
0_u2 21.377 16.503 (2.029)a 13.154 (2.533)a 
CONSTANT 55.350 (7.092)a 49.112 (10.649)a 54.319 (13.754)a 
DEMO - 4.105 (- 1.091) 1.671 (0.574) - 0.476 (- 0.103) 
DPER 6.504 (1.738)a 2.951 (1.173) 5.289 (1.796)a 
P - 0.951 (-1.145) - 1.346 (-2.960)a - 1.551 (-2.766)a 
Y 0.935 (1.111) 1.189 (2.741)a 0.940 (4.389)a 
U - 0.673 (- 0.495) 0.418 (0.504) - 0.507 (- 0.509) 
p 1.0 1.0 0.823 (2.176)a 
Log-likelihood 
function - - 450.21 -451.19 
Note: Wald test of restrictions imposing equality of the co,s across equations: Aw = 2.73 < 4.61 = X2 y)(2). The 
restrictions are not rejected. Likelihood ratio test of restrictions imposing equality of the :o,s across equations: 
ALR = 1.978 < 4.61 = X029)(2). The restrictions are not rejected. 
' Significant at the 0.10 level. 
Although the impacts of economic variables 
are qualitatively similar in the approval and vot- 
ing equations, there are some notable differences 
in magnitudes. In the approval equation, the in- 
flation coefficient is almost twice as large as the 
GNP growth coefficient, but in the voting equa- 
tion the two coefficients are comparable in mag- 
nitude. Despite the apparent differences, a Wald 
test cannot reject the hypothesis of equal wois 
across equations at the 0.10 significance level. 
This result is confirmed by a likelihood ratio test 
based on restricted and unrestricted SUR esti- 
mates. Given the paucity of voting equation ob- 
servations and the resulting low power of these 
tests, we should interpret such results cautiously 
-a failure to reject the restrictions does not 
imply that we should accept them. A "failure to 
reject" the restrictions is perhaps best considered 
a minimal requirement for researchers who are 
inclined to impose such restrictions a priori. 
SUR estimates which impose the restriction of 
equal wois confirm the importance of GNP growth 
and inflation as performance indicators; the un- 
employment coefficient is again insignificant. In 
the voting equation, ,3 (measuring the overall 
sensitivity of voting to economic performance) is 
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positive and significantly different from zero, in- 
dicating that the linear combination of perfor- 
mance measures does influence voting. The esti- 
mate of ,3 is less than one, but not significantly 
so. A value of ,3 less than one indicates that 
economic performance has a smaller percentage 
impact on voting than on approval ratings. This is 
reasonable if voting decisions depend more heav- 
ily on omitted prospective variables (like policy 
positions) than approval ratings do. 
Robustness of the results to alternative speci- 
fications is, as always, an issue of concern. In this 
paper I have not searched for a "best" spec- 
ification of economic performance indicators; 
rather I have selected a specification which is 
broadly representative of the existing literature.15 
Whether alternative models of voter behavior 
would lead to different implications about the 
consistency of the behavior patterns producing 
voting and approval rates provides a question for 
future research efforts. I have, however, done 
some sensitivity testing with alternative specifica- 
tions of the noneconomic variables in the ap- 
proval ratings equation. These tests will be briefly 
described here; detailed results are available from 
the author upon request. 
I first considered variations in the handling of 
honeymoon effects and political events. Omitting 
any or all of the political events variables has no 
substantive effects on reported results, nor does 
replacing the series of honeymoon dummies with 
a declining linear trend over the early quarters of 
a president's tenure. In each case, the cross-equa- 
tion restrictions implying behavioral consistency 
cannot be rejected. 
I next replaced the president-specific intercepts 
with a common intercept and a party dummy. 
Since a Wald test based on the original unre- 
stricted SUR estimates does not reject the hy- 
pothesis of equal presidential intercepts, this rep- 
resents a reasonable reformulation of the model. 
Coefficient estimates are similar to those re- 
ported earlier, but the impacts of inflation rela- 
tive to growth are a bit larger in the approval 
equation and a bit smaller in the voting equation, 
making the differences between equations more 
pronounced. More importantly, estimated stan- 
dard errors for the coefficients of economic vari- 
ables in the approval equation'are notably smaller, 
and the hypothesis of behavioral consistency is 
now rejected at the 0.01 significance level.16 This 
result considerably strengthens earlier sugges- 
tions of stronger inflation aversion in poll re- 
sponses than in voting. 
In further sensitivity testing, I have estimated 
the model for a sample which adds the eight 
elections from 1916 to 1944 to the voting equa- 
tion. Under the assumption that voting was stable 
over the 1916 to 1988 period, the consistency of 
voting and approval ratings is again rejected-and 
the polls again indicate greater inflation aversion. 
This adds force to the view that voting and poll 
responses differ, but it is contingent on the ques- 
tionable assumption of voting function stability 
over the pre-war and post-war periods. The test 
of behavioral consistency in this case confounds 
differences between voting and poll responses 
with variations in voting behavior over time. Al- 
though the hypothesis of a stable voting function 
cannot be rejected at the usual significance levels, 
there are at least suggestions of voting 
instability."7 Thus, while the sensitivity tests 
strengthen the case against the hypothesis of be- 
havioral consistency, conclusions must remain 
somewhat clouded. 
IV. Summary and Conclusions 
In this paper I have jointly estimated equations 
explaining presidential voting and presidential 
approval ratings, treating the equations as seem- 
ingly unrelated regressions with unequal numbers 
of observations. My results are broadly consistent 
with previous voting and approval rating studies 
of Fair, Hibbs, and others. GNP growth and 
inflation appear to matter for both voters and 
poll respondents; evidence of unemployment ef- 
fects is weak. Since the results are qualitatively 
15 I have also estimated a model dropping the insignificant 
unemployment variable, obtaining results similar to those 
described here. 
16 For the Wald test of the hypothesis of equal w1s across 
equations we obtain A, = 13.128 > 9.21 = Xo299(2); the hy- 
pothesis is rejected. 
17 For a Wald test of the hypothesis of stable coefficients for 
the economic variables in pre-war and post-war periods, we 
obtain Aw = 3.60 < 6.25 = Xo.90(3); the hypothesis is not re- 
jected. However, in results for the extended sample, the 
unemployment coefficient in the voting equation has an im- 
plausible positive sign. If unemployment is dropped from the 
model, then inflation coefficients differ significantly over the 
pre-war and post-war periods, and stability of the vote func- 
tion is rejected. 
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similar for voters and poll respondents, it appears 
that the poll results provide meaningful evalua- 
tions which are related to voting decisions. 
The results also point to some differences in 
the behavior of voters and poll respondents, how- 
ever. Estimates consistently, if not strongly, indi- 
cate that poll respondents are more concerned 
with inflation and less concerned with GNP 
growth than voters are. The hypothesis that vot- 
ers and poll respondents employ identical stan- 
dards in evaluating economic performance is not 
rejected in the original specification, but can be 
rejected in some plausible reformulations of the 
model. Given these results it is reasonable to 
remain cautious regarding the interchangeability 
of voting data and poll data. 
When considering why voting and approval rat- 
ings might differ in their responses to economic 
indicators, distinctions between retrospective and 
prospective considerations are likely to be impor- 
tant. The focus of the approval question on job 
performance may encourage retrospective evalua- 
tions, while voting may be more heavily influ- 
enced by prospective criteria. If recent GNP 
growth is a better "leading indicator" than the 
rate of inflation, then the results reported here 
are consistent with a more prospective outlook by 
voters. 
APPENDIX 1 
Likelihood Function for the Voting and Approval 
Ratings Model 
Below I provide the log-likelihood function for individual 
observations under 3 cases: (1) the presidential vote is ob- 
served, but an approval rating is not observed, (2) there is no 
presidential election, but an approval rating is observed, and 
(3) both the presidential vote and an approval rating are 
observed. First define e * and u * as follows: 
t = V- a - (IP, + W2U1 + w3Yt) - CX, 
ett = At-aY- I ( Pt + W2Ut + W3Yt) - YXt 
The log-likelihood function for observations in the various 
cases is provided below: 
Case I. Vote observed, approval rating not observed: 
log(L1) = -0.5 log(2 7rwo-2) - O.5(u* /o )2. 
Case II. Vote not observed, approval rating observed: 
log(L,) = -0.5 log(27o-e2) -0.5(e, / )2. 
Case III. Vote observed, approval rating observed: Let D = 
(o22 - os2), then 
log(L,) = -log(27v) - 0.5 log(D) - o-)/22D) (e/ k)2 
-(u2/2D) (u )2 + (o-,,/D)e*u*u 
The log-likelihood function for the sample is the sum of the 
log-likelihoods for the individual observations. 
APPENDIX 2 
Data Definitions and Sources 
V The incumbent party's percentage of the 2-party 
vote in a presidential election. Source: Fair 
(1978) and the Statistical Abstract of the United 
States. 
A The percentage of respondents answering "ap- 
prove" to the Gallup Survey question: "Do you 
approve or disapprove of the way that - is 
handling his job as president?" Source: various 
issues of the Gallup Report, the Gallup Opinion 
Index and the Gallup Political Index. This vari- 
able is computed as an average across all polls 
conducted within a quarter. I have interpolated 
to obtain values for three quarters in which no 
polls were reported. 
POSTk A dummy variable equal to 1 in the kth quarter 
of a new administration's tenure (k = 1, . . ., 6); 
else equal to 0. 
EISEN A series of dummy variables indicating, respec- 
KENNEDY tively, Presidents Eisenhower, Kennedy, John- 
JOHNSON son, Nixon, Ford, Carter, and Reagan. Each 
NIXON dummy is equal to 1 for quarters during the 
FORD indicated presidency and is otherwise equal 
CARTER to 0. 
REAGAN 
WATERG A dummy variable equal to 1 for the period 
1973 4 to 1974 2 (beginning with the firing of 
Archibald Cox and continuing until Nixon's res- 
ignation); else equal to 0. 
IRAN A dummy variable equal to 0.5 for 1986 4, 
equal to 1 for 1987 1 to 1987 4, and otherwise 
equal to 0. Note: Only one of the two polls 
administered in 1986 4 came after the revela- 
tion of the arms-for-hostages negotiations with 
Iran. The congressional Iran-Contra committee 
submitted its final report in 1987 4. 
KILLED The number (in thousands) of servicemen killed 
in action in Vietnam in the quarter. Sources: 
Milstein (1974) and the Statistical Abstract of the 
United States 
P If the current administration has been in office 
at least 4 quarters, P is the absolute value of a 
4-quartef moving average of quarterly inflation 
rates. If the current administration has been in 
office for less than 4 quarters, P is the average 
of the absolute values of inflation rates within 
the administration's term. The inflation rate is 
computed as an annualized percentage change 
in the GNP deflator. Source: CITIBASE data 
tape. 
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U If the current administration has been in office 
at least 4 quarters, U is a 4-quarter moving 
average of the quarterly percentage unemploy- 
ment rate. If the current administration has 
been in office for less than 4 quarters, U is the 
average of unemployment rates within the ad- 
ministration's term. Source: CITIBASE data 
tape. 
Y If the current administration has been in office 
at least 4 quarters, Y is a 4-quarter moving 
average of the annualized percentage quarterly 
growth rate of real GNP. If the current admin- 
istration has been in office for less than 4 
quarters, Y is the average of the growth rates 
within an administration's term. Source: 
CITIBASE data tape. 
DEMO A dummy variable equal to 1 when the incum- 
bent president is a Democrat; else equal to 0. 
DPER A dummy variable equal to 1 in quarters when 
an incumbent president runs for reelection; else 
equal to 0. 
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